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I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of the relationships between the United
States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) has drawn much
attention since 1972, when President Nixon visited China and
agreed to the Shanghai Communique. Improvements in relations
between the two countries since 1972 have been enormous.
Economic relations have had a great influence on the trade
between the countries.
This paper will examine what has happened in the past,
what is currently occurring, and what is expected to happen
in the future to the economic relationships between the two
countries. This paper will review trade between the two
countries since 1950. Focus will be on those factors that
have had significant impacts on trade between the two
countries. The political and economic conditions of the two
countries, which have great impacts on trade, will be the most
important aspects of this paper. Three periods are employed
to indicate the development: 1) the period before 1972; 2) the
period from 1972 to 1979; and 3) the period since 1979. In
1972 and 1979, there were historical changes in the
relationships between the two countries; namely, the 1972
Shanghai Communique and the 1979 Normalization.
II. THE PERIOD BEFORE 1972
A. Political Relations
Friendly relationships between China and the United
States did not exist during the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, we
observed abnormal and unfriendly relations. Relations between
the two countries could be summarized as follows: open
hostilities during the 1950s and antagonism during the 1960s.
The "open hostilities" here refers to the two countries
treating the other as an enemy. The "Antagonism" here means
that the two countries treated the other as a "competitor" in
ideological, political, economic, and other fields. Both
countries tried to demonstrate their own power (Stoessel)
.
There are two main reasons that the relationships between the
two countries were so bad; first, in the late 1940s, the USA
supported the Nationalists of China in the Chinese Civil War,
and treated Taiwan as an independent nation. There were
official relations between the United States and Taiwan before
1972. This was the biggest barrier that the two countries had
to cross before reaching a normal relationship, since Beijing
claimed that Taiwan had been a part of the PRC. Second, in
the early 1950s, both China and the United States were
involved in the Korean War and they were fighting face to
face. The hostilities between the U.S. and PRC were strong
for a long time after the Korean War. Third, China's ideology
during that time followed the work of Karl Marx, who treated
capitalism as a very unfair and dangerous social system that
was expected to collapse in the future. This ideology was
related to the belief that socialism would succeed over
capitalism, and communism would be realized in the entire
world.
China had no trade relations with most capitalist
countries until the relations between China and the USSR were
broken in the early 1960s. In the 1960s, China's political
strategy changed. China tried to demonstrate the advantages
of socialism over capitalism. The slogan during that time was
'pass over the British and the USA. ' However, the progress
was interrupted by the Cultural Revolution, which was a
political movement started by Chairman Mao. During that time,
class struggle was the center of every Chinese person's life.
All else was not important, including economic development.
The social and economic losses of the Cultural Revolution are
impossible to be estimated. China lost a whole generation
during the Cultural Revolution. Those persons about 35 years
old today lost the chance to get a normal education, they went
to countryside to get reeducation from the peasants when they
should have been studying in schools. China lost the chance
to improve its economy, while Taiwan, South Korea and
Singapore made big improvements in their industrialization
process.
Although China supported Communist Vietnam in the late
1960s, the relations between the United States and China did
not revert to what of the early 1950s. During this conflict,
the Chinese rulers held a different view; the government
realized that China could not reap any benefits from a face-
to-face fight with the United States.
B. Economic Relations
Before President Richard M. Nixon went to China in 1972,
the economic relations between the two countries were almost
nonexistent. Although the data of the nonagricultural trading
value between the two countries is not available for this
period, evidence indicates that trade between the two
countries was small or nonexistent. For example, according
to the "U.S. Foreign Trade Statistical Report", U.S.
agricultural exports to the PRC averaged only 7.45 million
dollars each year during 1950-54, with agricultural imports
from the PRC averaging 34.6 million dollars each year. From
1955 to 1971, the U.S. had no agricultural exports to China.
Although the U.S. had agricultural imports from the PRC in
some years, the values were very small: only 1,000 dollars in
1960, 2,000 dollars in 1962, 11,000 dollars in 1963, and 4,000
dollars in 1969. Obviously, trade relations between the two
countries were inhibited during the period before 1972.
Political disparities had a significant influence on the
economic relations of the two countries. Trade relationships
could not be normalized without certain normal political,
diplomatic relations between the two countries and legal
agreements. Because of hostilities in early 1950s, the U.S.
employed a trade embargo against China as a sanction for
China's participation in the Korean War. The United States
allowed no direct trade with China and no technology transfer.
This made bilateral trading impossible.
There were no economic ties between the two countries,
such as banking, insurance, or investment before 1972. After
New China was founded in 1949, the American government enacted
a strict economic blockade against China and froze all
deposits in the United States that belonged to the Bank of
China. In addition, before 1972, the account of China's trade
with America were settled by a third-country, who had trade
relations with the United States. Because during that time,
direct trade between the two countries was still prohibited
(Wu).
On the Chinese side, economic policies were based on
ideology. China did not want to depend on capitalist
countries in any way. The industrialized countries in Western
Europe were trading partners only to fill in gaps where
China's socialist trade partners were weak or unable to finish
goods fast enough to keep pace with China's ambitious
industrialization programs. China's scarcity on foreign
exchange also limited its trade. In addition, the U.S. export
control policies also made trade relations between the two
countries impossible. China was classified as a "Z" country
by the U.S., which was subject to a total trade embargo.
Abnormal relations were very costly for both countries.
The U.S. might lose a lot in the sense that it could have
gained substantially from the trade with China at that time
and could have had a fiirm ground for today's trade share in
the Chinese market if there were normal political and
diplomatic relations between the two countries, just as
between China and Japan.
The trade embargo of the U.S. and other Western countries
had a negative impact on China's economy. China had to shift
its trade to its communist partners, which could not provide
advanced technology. If there had been a good relationship
throughout the period, the two countries could have
concentrated their own economic development, and the relations
between the two countries could have been established earlier,
which were the common interests of both the Americans and the
Chinese. People from both countries will not forget this
period of history.
III. THE PERIOD FROM 1972 TO 1979
The year 1972 was a historical one for the United States
and the People's Republic of China. This is the year of
President Nixon's visit to China. During this visit, the two
countries opened their doors to each other and the relations
between the two countries improved significantly, although
some areas could have been improved much further if there had
been normal relations between the two countries.
A. Political Relations
When U.S. Secretary of the State Henry A. Kissinger
received a letter from the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai on July
2, 1971, in which Zhou told him that Chairman Mao Zedong and
Zhou welcomed President Nixon's visit to China and Kissinger's
preparatory visit, Kissinger said to Nixon, "I think this is
the most important letter an American president has received
since World War II," because he knew that the contact of the
two super nations would have a great impact on the strategic
and political balance of the world. At the beginning of the
contact of the two countries in 1972, the U.S. focus of the
relationships was almost entirely on its shared strategic
concerns over the Soviet power and expansion. Beijing
realized that the United States was the only "super power" in
the world that could offset the pressure coming from the
Soviet Union. Although there were different views on certain
international affairs between the two countries, there were
common interests for both sides in resisting Soviet pressures
and in seeking changes in Soviet policies that would genuinely
reduce tensions in the region and in the world. This has
remained a central element in the relations between the two
countries since 1972.
With the signing of the 1972 Shanghai Communique, the
United States agreed that the People's Republic of China was
the sole legal government of China and Taiwan was a part of
PRC. This treaty destroyed the toughest political barrier
between the two countries. Actually, when Kissinger
negotiated this very sensitive issue with Zhou Enlai, Zhou
claimed that the PRC was China's sole government, the drive
to liberate Taiwan was China's internal affair, and U.S.
troops must withdraw from Taiwan. These three principles were
not subject to change. Kissinger, however, insisted that
America should not abandon its old friend. But finally, both
sides compromised.
Since 1972, these two countries had maintained high-
quality dialogues on many issues about the relations between
the two countries and other international issues. Both sides
have been trying to develop a deeper, more extensive, durable
and friendly relationship in many areas. They tried to
understand each other even they had totally different social
systems. The 1972 visit of President Nixon and the 1975 visit
of President Gerald Ford to China indicated that the U.S. was
interested in China. In May 1973, a liaison office from each
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country was set up in Washington D.C. and Beijing. In
December 15, 1978, the two governments announced the
establishment of diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979.
Meanwhile, trade values between the two countries increased
rapidly compared to the period before 1972. The improvement
of the Sino-U.S. relations is very important. When we recall
the Sino-U.S. history, we cannot find friendly relations,
except during the World War II. The close relations between
the two countries would contribute to the stability of the
world. In addition, there was a big potential of trade
between the two countries. The development of Sino-U.S. trade
is in the best interest of both countries. While China is
lacking technology and capital, but has a big potential
market, the United States has technology and capital, but
needs markets. Cooperation could enhance the standard of
living in both countries.
In a speech at Notre Dame University in May 22, 1977,
President Carter said, "It is important that we make progress
towards normalizing relations with the People's Republic of
China. We see the American-Chinese relationships as a central
element of our global policy, and China as a key force for
global peace." This reflected the guideline of the Carter
Administration's foreign policy stance toward China.
The pragmatism of both governments helped them both put
aside the myths and unrealistic expectations of the other.
The foreign policies of the two countries were sometimes
accused of being short-sighted, because both sides treated
the other as an enemy and ignored all of the more important
aspects of a normal Sino-U.S. relationship. This has no
longer been the case since 1972. Both countries regarded the
other as a key force for world peace. All evidence indicates
that these two countries could understand each other very well
in many important international issues, not only because both
countries have been playing important roles in the world, but
they have common strategic
,
political, and economic
interests. The concerns over the Soviet Union formed the
basis of their common strategic and political interests.
B. Economic Relations
Since 1972, China has been more open to Western
industrialized countries. The trade values of China have
increased substantially since then. China has become more
interested in the free market world than communist countries
which were its traditional trade partners. There was a common
trend that both China's exports and imports shifted from the
communist nations to non-communist countries. This can be
reflected in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3, which show the
tendency of PRC's export, import, and total trade structure.
The trade between PRC and the non-communist countries
has dominated since the mid-1960s. The non-communist
countries increased their share of China's trade to 8 3 percent
in 1977. China realized that Western advanced sciences and
10
Figure 1
PRC Exports
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Source: "People's EepuCllc of cuina : Foreign TraQe
ia Machiaery and Eeiuipment Since 1952',
Central Intelligence Agency, 1976.
technology could contribute alot to its modernization
programs. Before 1949, China had a long history of a feudal
Figure 2
PRC Inports
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Source
:
"People's Hepuilic of China: Foreign Trade
in Machinery and Equipment Since 1952",
Central Intelligence Agency. 1976.
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system. Even after 1949, China had no experience with
industrialization. Instead, Chinese history was a history of
continuous political movements. China's sciences and
technology were far behind the Western countries. China knew
that the best way to catch up with those countries was to
import modern Western technology.
Figure 3
PRC Total Trade ^ Export + Import^
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Source: "People's Repucilc of cnina : Foreign Trade
m Macninery and Equlpient Since 1952",
Central Intelligence Agency, 1976.
The origins of the economic ties since the early 1970s
between the two countries could be traced to the Shanghai
Communique of February 1972, in which China and the United
States agreed to facilitate the progressive development of
trade between their two countries. The Communique stated
that, "economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit
are in the interest of the people of the two countries" (U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment
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Center)
.
(1) China's own economic strategy and trade policy
During the early 1970s, Beijing adopted a more outward-
looking economic policy in order to spur its process of
development. By 1975, trade value had more than tripled over
its 1970 level of $4 billion. According to the former Foreign
Trade Minister's statement in October 1977, trade would play
an important role in the approach of China's modernization.
Through trade, China could get the advanced technology. She
needed and improve her domestic economy.
China adopted basically self-reliant, selective use
imports of advanced technology policy. China gave import
priorities to transportation, energy, communication, while
encouraged its domestic industry to realize its potential by
using existing technology. China's marketing power limited
its imports, even high-technology products. Also, China did
not want to develop an economy highly dependent on Western
countries. China's policy was to import advanced technology
and convert it to China's own technology by absorbing it.
This policy was more flexible than before. China also adopted
a policy of financing imports by exports to avoid large
foreign debt. It seems that China's financial policies during
that time were still somewhat conservative. China did not
want to develop its economy by borrowing foreign capital,
which would be risky. Before 1973, foreign trade had never
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been an important part in China • s economy and the annual total
trade value had never excessed $10 billion. Also, China had
no experience with foreign loans, so it was difficult to
predict the economic consequence of foreign debt, such as
facing Brazil and Argentina. China's financial policies were
conservative in the 1970s, because of the success of China's
use of foreign loans in the 1980s indicates that a small
amount of foreign debt might not have such a big risk as
predicted.
(2) U.S. economic policy toward China
The U.S. import controls were lifted in late 1971 and
export controls were lifted in 1972. The U.S. imports from
China increased continuously from 1972 to 1979 period, while
U.S. exports to China were unstable, with great fluctuation.
This is related to the U.S. market power to buy small value
of China's commodities, items of U.S. exports to China,
China's own agricultural condition, and the lack of diplomatic
relations.
The U.S. still adopted an export control policy for high-
technology products and an import protection policy. The U.S.
trade policies have been very complex. Until 198 0, the U.S.
did not grant the Most-Favored- Nation (MFN) treatment to
China. MFN is a special trade status a country gives to its
trade partners in terms of tariff difference. Before 1972,
the U.S. classified China as a "Z" country, which was subject
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to a total trade embargo. After 1972, China was moved into
"Y" status, a category which includes the USSR, which allowed
the U.S. and its allies to sell only certain nonstrategic
items to China. On the U.S. import side, China's commodities
were subject to high tariffs which made it impossible for the
Chinese commodities to compete in the American markets.
TaUsle 1
Tariffs On Leading Chinese Exports To The U.S.
top 15 products without MFN with MFN
printclose shirting 17% 9.51%
tin other than
alloys , unwrought free free
feathers 20% 15%
fireworks cl2 per lb cl2 per lb
antiques free free
downs 20% 15%
white cotton sheeting 13.5% 7.61%
bamboo baskets and bags 50% 25%
bristles c3 per lb c3/4 per lb
cashews, shelled c2 per lb free
tungsten ore c50 per lb c2 5 per lb
floor covering, pile 45% 11%
men's cotton shirts 45% 21%
cotton gloves 25% 25%
tea, crude or processed free free
Source: Subcommittee On International Trade. Nov. 15.
1979. P. 100
(3) Details of the U.S. -China trade during that period
Figure 4 summarizes what has happened to the U.S. -China
trade during 1970-79 period. While China was not a major
trading nation of the United States, the trade between the
two countries was still important to both sides, because China
15
Table 2
U.S. Tariffs On The Chinese Export With Potential
In The U.S. Market
without. MFN (%) with MFN (%)
organic chemicals 24.5 6.3
essential oils 31.3 4.2
chemical products & materials 24.8 6.9
textile yarn & thread 45 10.5
cotton fabrics, woven 15.7 8.7
textile fabrics, woven other
than cloth 59 21.2
pottery 52.9 20.1
furniture 46 12.5
travel goods, handbags , etc
.
50.8 21.5
clothing & accessories 58.2 21.5
footwear 27.4 10.4
toys, games, sporting goods.
jewelry and related articals 67 16.3
manufactured articals 50.5 13.0
Source: Subcommittee On International Trade. Nov. 15,
1979. P. 101
was the major U.S. trade partner of certain agricultural
products in some years and trade is often a indication of
political relations. The United States increased their share
of China's trade. For example, in 1976, the United States was
the 8th largest trade partner of China, in 1977, the United
States became the 7th largest trade partner of China,
following Japan, Hong Kong, West Germany, Australia, Romania,
and Canada (U.S. National Foreign Assessment Center)
.
While the U.S. imports from China steadily increased
during this period, the U.S. exports to China were uneven in
some senses —expanding enormously from $63 million in 1972
16
Figure 4
High I ights of US- China Trade
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Source: US FOREIGN TRADE HIGHLIGHTS. USDC.
data show f .a,s. exports and
f.o.b. imports
to $819 million in 1974 (the U.S. was China's second largest
trade partner in 1974), and falling to $135 million in 1976.
There were several reasons that the U.S. exports to China
fluctuated significantly during the period.
First, the major U.S. exports to China during that time
were agricultural products. China's agricultural imports
depended highly on China's own agricultural production. The
fluctuation of U.S. exports to China reflects the unstable
performance of China's agriculture during that period.
Second, since there was lack of diplomatic relations
between the two countries during the period, China treated
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the United States as a residual source of supply if other
import sources were available. There were several major
western trade partners of China: Japan, West Germany, Hong
Kong, Australia, Canada, and some other countries. China
usually purchased imports from Canada and Australia when the
U.S. and China had political disagreements. For example, the
different viewpoint of the two countries toward the communist
movements in some Third World countries often affect the Sino-
U.S. trade relations.
Third, prices of the United States products were not
competitive with world prices during some years. The index
of the competitor prices of the U.S. is 100 in 1975.
From Figure 5 we can see that in almost every year from
1970 to 1978, the U.S. export prices were above the average
prices of its competitors.
Trade during this period could be characterized by
erratic U.S. exports and slow but steady growth in U.S.
imports. China would not pay the costs to avoid importing
U.S. goods even there were some disputes between the two
governments. Foreign trade was not a strong weapon for China
to develop the relations with Western countries because of
lack of market power. China suffered too much in 1950s and
1960s in foreign trade. During those two decades, China did
not concentrate on economic development, and had few trade
relations with the Western countries. China needed advanced
technology from the United States to achieve its economic
18
Figure 5
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National Foreign Assessment Center,
August 1979.
goals.
In 1974, the U.S. exports to China reached $820 million
and quickly became the second largest trade partner of China,
following Japan. However, agricultural exports, which
accounted for three-fourths of total U.S. export to China in
1972-75, were rapidly phased out with China's import needs
being met by the traditional suppliers. There were three
other deals - for 10 Boeing aircraft, eight fertilizer plants,
and 100,000 tons of aluminum - that accounted for the bulk of
U.S. nonagricultural exports to China.
In 1976, the United States registered its first trade
deficit with China since 1971. Before the 1979 Normalization,
19
the U.S. viewed Beijing's unwillingness to permit a sharp
improvement in trade relations as the major impediment for
U.S. exports to China.
China's demand for high-technology American goods
remained large. However, U.S. strategic trade controls on
computers and other sophisticated equipment would continue to
hamper sales if no new policy was made. Even so, U.S. firms
continued to benefit from sale of U.S. technical processes
embodied in plants sold to China by third countries. China
had no similar qualms on exports to the United States and made
efforts to develop the U.S. markets.
Before normalization, non-MFN tariffs were a serious
barrier only to some Chinese goods. More important was the
limited U.S. demand for some of China's traditional exports.
In addition, U.S. nontariff restrictions such as the
regulations involving product safety or the Food and Drug
Administration restricted the entry of other Chinese exports.
There were many problems in the trade of the so-called
"sensitive commodities", such as textiles and footwear. The
reason that those commodities were "sensitive" was that in
the United States, the domestic business of this kind of
production did not pay low wages, and as a result could not
compete with the Asian countries, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan,
China and South Korea. For example, in China, a worker can
only make about $100 each month. The U.S. government imposed
controls to limit the imports of the sensitive commodities to
20
protect its domestic business. Usually the U.S. made some
import quantity control agreements with other countries.
Table 3 shows U.S. -China trade details over the 1972-76 period
Table 3
US-China Trade
Million
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
US Exports 63 740 819 304 135
Ag. commodities 61 628 668 80
of which:
Wheat 35 308 234
Corn 24 141 96
Soybeans 55 138
Cotton 101 186 80
Vegetable oils 2 19 8
Metals 31 22 83 47
of which:
Steel scrap 24 12 13 4
Aluminum 3 47 26
Iron & Steel pipe 3 12 11
Machinery & Equip. 2 69 107 119 65
of which:
Aircraft, include
engines, parts,
& accessories 63 76 2 1
Other 12 22 22 23
US Imports 32 64 115 158 201
Foodstuffs & 4 7 16 16 24
Tobacco
Textiles & Apparel
Handicrafts
Bristles, down &
feathers
Chemicals
Nonferrous minerals
& metals
Other
Source: CHINA ECONOMY, by National Foreign Assessment
Center, P. 10, exports show f.a.s. and imports
show f.o.b.
7 15 36 45 69
8 15 20 22 32
8 8 10 6 24
2 8 18 16 18
2 8 11 42 19
1 3 4 11 15
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(National Foreign Assessment Center) . In table 3 , we notice
that China imported relatively large volumes of grain in some
years. Agricultural imports have played an important role in
China's trade strategy. China is still continuously
struggling to solve its "food problem". In China, per capita
grain production was less than 400 kg, which could only meet
basic human nutrition need. This also limited the development
of livestock and poultry. For example, in 1978, per capita
consumption of pork was only 7.6 kg, of eggs, only 2 kg. This
kind of food structure was far behind the Western countries.
During this period, several million hectares of cropland were
used for nonagricultural purposes. The increass in grain
output were mainly from increasing yields. Even in some years
the output of agriculture increased, but most of the increase
was offset by the growth in population. In addition, the
level of per capita production of grain during most of the
1970s was lower than during the 1950s. For example, if the
index of per capita production of grain in 1956 is 100, the
indexes from 1972 to 1978 were lower than 100. The main
reason is that the population growth rate was higher than the
growth rate of production. See Figure 6.
In the future, China will still need to import agricultural
products, because the easiest gains have already been made
from the " household contract responsibility system " and it
is extremely difficult to increase the productivity of
agricultural production sharply in a short time. The
22
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responsibility system allows fanners to keep the remains of
their products when they finish the quota signed in the
contract with the government. The contract made the
responsibilties clear to both farmers and government. Farmers
agree to sell certain amount of agricultural products to the
state at prices listed in the contract. This gave farmers
great incentives to increase their production. Before 1979,
the "People's Commune" system was called "Iron Bowel" system
with equal distribution, no matter how well and how much you
did. Under that system, farmers did not have any incentives
to increase their production, because they could not get
enough benefit from their work.
23
China's foreign trade policy has been liberalized in some
surprising ways since 1978. Beijing was willing to engage in
direct borrowing for longer term, barter agreements, product
payback schemes for imports, importing goods to be reprocessed
for export, and even some forms of joint venture with foreign
firms. But in 1978, direct government-to-government loans and
direct foreign investment were still prohibited (U.S.
National Foreign Assessment Center)
.
During the 1972-79 period, the development of the Sino-
U.S. relationships were comprehensive.
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IV. THE PERIOD SINCE 1979
On January 1, 1979, China and the United States reached
full normalization of diplomatic relations. This was a big
improvement of the Shanghai Communique. During the same
month. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping made a historical visit to
the United States, and Vice President Walter F. Mondale
visited China. Since then, the relations between the two
countries have been becoming deeper, more friendly, extensive
and durable.
A. Political Relations
In June 1982, Deputy Secretary of the State Walter J.
Stoessel, Jr., made an address before the National Council on
U.S. -China trade. He said that a strong U.S. -China
relationship was one of the highest goals of President
Reagan's foreign policy. This relationship was not only
critical for the U.S. long-term security but also would
contribute to Asian stability and global harmony. The U.S.
realized that China would be an important element in world
affairs, especially to the Soviet-U.S. relationship. The U.S.
could reduce its pressure from the Soviet Union if there was
a good Sino-U.S. relationship.
In his letter to Premier Zhao, President Reagan noted
that "Our contacts have embraced almost all areas of human
endeavor.
"
In May 31, 1984, assistant secretary for East Asian and
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Pacific Affairs Paul D. Wolfowitz made an address on Sino-U.S.
trade. He said that the relationship between the two
countries was neither a predominantly economic nor a
predominantly strategic one but rather a comprehensive one
because each element reinforces the other. The economic
progress between the two countries is important itself, but
also is an important element in the strategic equation
(Wolfowitz)
.
Secretary Schultz said that the U.S. was seeking a
relationship that was no longer subject to the alternating
cycles of euphoria and depression that had characterized the
past, but one that rested on a stronger, more stable
foundation. This indicates that US government would not allow
the 1950s and 1960s history to repeat itself (Wolfowitz)
.
The visits of Presidents Reagan and Bush to China
strongly indicate that these two countries have taken their
new steps to develop a deepening bilateral relationship.
President Bush gained much experience in dealing with Chinese
issues when he worked at the U.S. embassy in Beijing in 1970s.
Many of China's leaders are his personal friends. The
personal relations between Bush and Chinese leaders also
should contribute to a good Sino-U.S. relationship.
B. Economic Relations
Following the Normalization in 1979, the trade between
the two countries increased substantially. Two-way trade
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between the two countries doubled in 1979 and again in 1980,
(Figure 7.)
Figure 7
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Sources: "CHINA", U5DA, August 1982.
"U.S. FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL TRADE
STATISTICAL REPORT, CALENDAR YEAR
1980-87", ERS.USDA,
The economic reform in China started in the agricultural
sector with the so-called "household contract responsibility
system", then they turned to the industrial sector and urban
areas. Since then, China has adopted more market-oriented
economic policies. Foreign trade has been an important factor
in China's drive for modernization. The structure of China's
foreign trade has changed since the early 197 0s. The
proportion of industrial goods to total exports rose, and the
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proportion of agricultural goods and related products dropped.
As for imported goods, the proportion of raw and other
materials for processing by light industry increased, while
the share of heavy machinery and steel dropped. China knew
that the most efficient way to enhance its export capability
was to develop its industry and to export industrial products
(USDA, ERS)
.
Following the Normalization, these two governments
concluded a general trade agreement, which called on the
American and Chinese governments to promote economic and trade
relations, and each to accord the other Most-Favored-Nation
(MFN) tariff treatment. Both also agreed to consult in the
event of bilateral trade problems. This is very important to
the Sino-U.S. trade. The big difference of tariffs with and
without MFN has great impact on trade. If there were no
agreements and MFN status, the trade could not have further
developed, because the high tariffs would block the potential
trade between the two countries.
In 1980, the United States took the first steps to
liberalize its controls on exports of high technology to China
and extended Eximbank (Export-Import Bank of the United
States) and OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation)
facilities in China. Later that year, the U.S. Department of
Commerce staged the first U.S. national trade exhibition in
Beijing, and the Chinese sponsored trade exhibitions in San
Francisco, Chicago, and New York. Those trade shows were
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efficient ways to make contact with end-users, survey market
prospects and introduce new products for both countries.
Agreements signed in the following years covered aviation,
shipping, textile trade, technology and science corporation,
and many other areas. Following are some examples.
1) An agreement between the governments of the United
States of America and the People's Republic of China on
Cooperation in Science and Technology was signed in Washington
on January 31, 1979. This agreement was extended on January
12, 1984. The S&T exchange agreement covers 29 fields.
2) An Agreement concerning to Civil Air Transport was
signed in Washington D.C. on September 17,1980.
3) An Agreement on Maritime Transport was signed at
Washington on September 17, 1980. This agreement was extended
on September 10, 1983.
4) An Agreement with respect to Mutual Exemption from
Taxation of Transportation Income of Shipping and Air
Transport Enterprises was signed in Beijing on March 5, 1982.
5) Accord on Industrial and Technological Cooperation
between the United States of America and the People's
Republic of China was signed in Washington D.C. on January
12, 1984.
The agreements spelled out trade principles that the two
countries should follow and made the responsibilities of both
sides clear.
Although China is not a major trade partner of the United
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states in terms of Market share (Table 4) , U.S. trade with
Table 4
PRC Market Share of US Trade ( % )
YEAR Export Import
Total Agri. Non-Agri. Total Agri . Non-Agri
.
1971 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 0.0000
1972 0.0013 0.0065 0.0000 0.0006 0.0025 0.0003
1973 0.0105 0.0354 0.0022 0.0009 0.0026 0.0007
1974 0.0084 0.0302 0.0021 0.0011 0.0026 0.0010
1975 0.0029 0.0036 0.0027 0.0016 0.0030 0.0015
1976 0.0012 0.0000 0.0015 0.0013 0.0050 0.0013
1977 0.0014 0.0028 0.0011 0.0019 0.0050 0.0010
1978 0.0061 0.0209 0.0020 0.0027 0.0056 0.0015
1979 0.0097 0.0287 0.0050 0.0043 0.0051 0.0024
1980 0.0176 0.0552 0.0088 0.0071 0.0076 0.0041
1981 0.0165 0.0458 0.0096 0.0091 0.0178 0.0063
1982 0.0140 0.0411 0.0082 0.0087 0.0111 0.0090
1983 0.0110 0.0151 0.0101 0.0094 0.0086 0.0088
1984 0.0141 0.0162 0.0136 0.0112 0.0099 0.0095
1985 0.0184 0.0054 0.0205 0.0127 0.0099 0.0113
1986 0.0149 0.0022 0.0168 0.0154 0.0095 0.0129
1987 0.0142 0.0127 0.0144 0.0155 0.0116 0.0156
Sources: " U S. FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICAL REPORT,
CALENDAR YEAR, 1980-87 ", ERS, USDA.
" CHINA ", USDA, AUGUST 1982 •
China can be and is very important to particular enterprises
and sectors of the United States. For example, China was the
sixth largest farm export market and the largest wheat export
market for the United States in 1980. In 1981, China was the
14th largest U.S. trading partner and the 5th largest market
for agricultural exports. At that time, at least 80 American
companies had established permanent offices in Beijing and a
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large range of cooperation in science and technology had been
done (Stoessel)
.
In the Spring of 1983, President Reagan expressed his
desire to see China modernize, when he directed that China
should be treated as a "friendly, nonallied" country with
respect to U.S. exports of high technology. He thought that
a prosperous China would be helpful to the stability of the
world and Asia.
In his address of Wolfowitz in 1984, he mentioned three
principles that seemed important as guides for the U.S.
government's approach to the trade relationship between the
two countries, First, that a modern Chinese economy is in both
countries' interests. Second, that it should be the role of
the government to facilitate and promote trade, though not at
the expense of security. Third, that in the trade arena, as
in other areas, it is important that both sides live up to the
agreements that they made (Wolfowitz)
.
In fact, the United States did realize their willingness
to help China. This is reflected by the categories of the
U.S. exports to China. The United States has raised the
levels of technology that would generally be made available
to China several times. The levels of permitted exports of
computers, scientific instruments, and microelectronic
manufacturing eguipment, were raised significantly. About 75
percent of all export applications for those items mentioned
above were processed under the new policy. The new
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liberalized guidelines have helped to encourage a healthy
increase in U.S. high-technology exports to China (Stoessel
1982) . The share of U.S. high-technology equipment in China
market increased rapidly after 1979 ( Table 5 )
.
Table 5
High-Technology US Share of PRC's
Equipment Share of Known Import of
Year US Export to PRC High-Tech. Equipment
( % ) ( % )
1979 5 10
1980 7 28
1981 3 16
1982 5 25
1983 24 47
1984 16 33
1985 35 40
1986 35 30
Source. CHINA: ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN 1987 AND OUTLOOK
FOR 1988, Central Intelligence Agency.
In 1982, about 2,000 American high-technology export licenses
were approved, with a total value of just over $450 million.
In 1983, there were 3,300 approvals with value of 1.1 billion,
in 1984, the value was over $1.5 billion (Wolfowitz) . The
rapid increase of U.S. high-technology exports to China
indicates that the U.S. continues to open its door to China
and did not treat China as a enemy or potentially dangerous
country, but a friendly nation.
In 1986 and 1987, the U.S. was the third largest trade
partner of China, behind Hong Kong and Japan. The United
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Table 6
Table
China's Export to USA & WORld (1000 $)
Year World USA USA Share USA Rank
1982 22347920 1798760 080488 3
1983 22226410 1722690 077506 3
1984 26139030 2432570 0. 093062 3
1985 27349820 2339530 0. 085540 3
1986 30942050 2631750 0, 085054 3
(following Hong Kong and Japan)
China's Import From the USA & World ( 1000$)
Year World USA USA Share USA Rank
1982 19292990 4373910 226709 1
1983 21389610 3770040 176255 2
1984 27409570 4037440 147300 2
1985 42252560 5090190 0. 120470 2
1986 42904450 4716690 0. 109934 2
(following Japan)
Source: CHINA TRADE AND PRICE STATISTICS IN 1987,
STATE STATISTICAL BUREAU, PRC.
States was China's largest market for clothing, and third
largest purchaser of yarns and fabric (U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency)
.
China made great efforts to successfully promote its
foreign trade. In 1986 and 1987, China narrowed its foreign
trade deficits. China uses several ways to promote rapid
growth in China trade; (1) provides priority domestic
investment funds to export-producing projects; (2) allows
export-producing Chinese factories to retain a share of their
foreign exchange earnings; (3) provides state subsidies to
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cover the losses of exporters selling goods at world prices
that are below China's costs of production; (4) has devalued
the Chinese currency relative to most major world currencies;
and (5) finally, China gives foreign investors special tax and
other incentives for participation in factories producing for
foreign markets. The exchange rates of RMB (Chinese currency)
to U.S. dollar were: 1:0.669 in 1980, 1:0.429 in 1984 and
1:0.340 in 1985. In 1987, China's export earnings reached
nearly $40 billion. By 1987, China had signed contracts for
more than 10,000 foreign-funded enterprises. All of these
factors indicate China's great desire to develop its economy
by improving its foreign trade.
During this period, the U.S. experienced constantly
increasing imports from China and fluctuating export rates to
China. This reflected the changes of China's own economic
development strategy and economic policy. From 1977 to 1980,
China's imports of manufactured products from the U.S.
increased rapidly, this was related to the Normalization.
When the Normalization was on its way to being realized, trade
relations were more productive and active. Both countries
tried to use the volume of trade as a signal of their welcome
of the Normalization. After the Normalization, these two
countries signed many trade agreements. China demonstrated
its immense interest in doing business with the United States.
However, because the Chinese government changed its domestic
economic policies, U.S. exports of machinery and equipment
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fell in 1981-82 from their 1980 level of $385 million, but
rose steadily through the following year to reach over $2
billion in 1986. China has emphasized the principle of
equality and mutual benefit, balance between domestic use and
export, and the balance of import and export. China's
marketing power depends on its export capability. Since 1985,
China has had problems with inflation. One reason was that
in a short period, China imported an excess of capital goods
and consumer goods. From 1978 to 1982, U.S. exports to China
consisted mainly of agricultural commodities. China's
agricultural imports from the United States decreased quickly
from 1981 and this decline affected the total U.S. exports to
China. This reflected the vastly improved performance of
China's own agricultural sector. During the following years
Chinese agriculture made some big improvements because of the
household responsibility systems and good natural conditions.
China did not import many agricultural products from the
United States from 1983 to 1987. U.S. non-agricultural
exports to China have increased significantly since 1982. In
1986, the proportion of U.S. non-agricultural exports to China
accounted for 97 percent of the total U.S. exports to China
(U.S. Department of Commerce)
.
The rapid growth of U.S. -China trade is also reflected by
the improvements in financial relationships between the two
countries. Since the early 1980s, China has enacted more
flexible policies toward foreign investment. On October 20,
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1980, the First National Bank of Chicago took the lead in
establishing a representative agency in Beijing. In June
1981, a representative agency of Chase National Bank opened
a business in Beijing. In September 1981, the Bank of China
established a branch in New York and a sub-branch in New
York's Chinatown. Recently, a Los Angeles branch was also set
up. With the expansion of the economic relations between the
two countries, many American banks have now established
representative agencies in Qingdao, Shanghai, Guangzhao, and
Shenzhen. At present, 13 American banks have set up their
representative agencies in China. Other financial
organizations from China also established representative
agencies or offices in America. In recent years, the Bank of
China has established agency relations with nearly 120
American commercial banks and 10 investment banks (Wu)
.
The financial relations between the two countries have
been improved significantly since the Normalization. Now many
American banks have started to deal with China in a serious
fashion. At the beginning of doing business with China, many
U.S. banks were concerned about the political and economic
environment in China. Since there had been no experience, it
seemed risky to do business with China. As experience
accumulated, doing business with China became less risky.
There are many Sino-U.S. joint ventures, for example,
Beijing's Jiangao Hotel. China International Financial Co.
Ltd. is the first commercial joint venture bank in China,
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which has also been established with the joint investments
from Chinese and American financial institutions as well as
other foreign banks.
The value of U.S. investments in China have increased
rapidly. By 1987, China and America had signed 408 contracts
for investment projects. The contracts stipulate that the
amount of investment from each side is to be U.S. $3.04
billion, accounting for 13.3 percent of China's total amount
of direct investment from foreign countries. Apart from Hong
Kong and Macao, America ranks top country that has the largest
investment in China. In recent years, the funds China
borrowed from the United States have been steadily increasing,
for example, $10 million in 1984, $17.7 million in 1985, $158
million in 1986, and $200.74 million in 1987 (Wu) .
The rapid growth of the financial relations have greatly
improved the economic relations between the two countries in
terms of financial institution numbers and values. China
benefited greatly from U.S. financial support, and its
domestic economy has made progress over the past ten years.
The United States has found a valuable market with great
potential. After 1979, about 25 percent of the U.S. Trade
and Development Program's (TDP) $2 million budget was
directed to projects in China. Also, the U.S. Eximbank offers
China the most favorable interests and repayment terms allowed
under the Arrangement on Official Export Credits of the
Organization for Economic Development (OECD) (USDC, 1988)
.
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V. PREDICTING THE FUTURE OF THE SINO-U.S. RELATIONSHIP
A. Political Relations
Since 1972, the relationships among the United States,
China and the Soviet Union have changed dramatically. Now is
the first time that the triangle relationship of the three
super nations, the U.S., the Soviet Union and China can be
improved simultaneously for the last several decades. It is
reasonable to reevaluate the Sino-U.S., Sino-Soviet and U.S.-
Soviet relationships.
There is a saying in America that the major motivation in
U.S.-Sino relations no longer exists, because the stress
between the U.S. and USSR is not as obvious as before and the
"cold war" is over, meaning the value of China as a political
pawn has decreased. Furthermore, along with the decline in
the Soviet threat, differences between the U.S. and China on
international matters may become more distinct. However, it
should be noticed that the only change between the U.S. -USSR
relations is that they have turned from military contention
to competition. Though the U.S. -Soviet relations have
improved dramatically, the nature of their contending with
each other has not changed and the confrontation continues.
Therefore, America still needs to use China to maintain power.
The U.S. is not willing to let China become too close to
Moscow, even if the normal China-Soviet relation would be
helpful to the peace of Asia. Meanwhile, though Sino-Soviet
relations are on their way to normalization, the Soviet threat
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to China's security has not yet totally disappeared. While
it may be correct that the strategic foundation of the Sino-
US relationship has been weakened, it is true that the
strategic concerns will still remain as a very important
element in the U.S. -China relationship.
B. Economic Relations
China and the United States have maintained talks on
bilateral trade and economic issues of mutual interest for
many years. There have been annual meetings of the Bilateral
Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) and the Joint
Economic Committee (JEC) , and the negotiations on China's
entry to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
the market talks are still continuing. However, there are
still some trade barrier problems which need to be solved in
this area.
The trade between the two countries has not been balanced.
The US trade deficit with China has increased in recent years.
( Figure 8 )
In the future, China will be willing to expand its trade
relations with the United States, especially high-technology
products and some agricultural products. China can not solve
the "food problem" completely in the short-term. In the long-
run, it will be a big challenge to China to deal with the
problem. There are several reasons why the food problem is
so serious to the Chinese. First, in each year, a huge amount
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of farmland was taken out of agriculture to be used for non-
agricultural purposes. Second, it is impossible to increase
crop productivity very quickly in the near future. Chinese
agriculture still depends highly on natural conditions,
especially on climate conditions. Third, the huge population
in China has been making the food problem more difficult.
Figure 9 illustrates the population growth and projection in
China over 1950 through 2 050. In April 14, 1989, China had
a record population of 1.1 billion. The population will
likely increase for a long time.
There are trade barriers between the two coountries which
need to be resolved in order to promote an increase in trade.
From the viewpoint of the United States, there are several
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Figure 9
Population Q'ovyrth Trend of China
1950-01. ;io:actM to 3090
SOURCE: "WORLD POPULATION BY COUNTRY AND
REGION, 1950-86, AND PROJECTIONS TO
2050", Francis Urban & Phi lip Rose,
ERS, USDA,
trade barriers imposed by China:
(1) China's Tariff and Other Import Charges
China adheres to the traditional use of tariffs as a tool
to protect its domestic industry. Between the end of 1985 and
mid-1987, tariffs on 21 items were raised. In 1985, China
subjected some import items to an "import regulatory tax".
This tax is levied in addition to customs tariffs on a range
of items including numerous consumer goods, vehicles and
synthetic fibers. The purpose of using this tax is to
discourage demand for this kind of import. The Chinese
Customs Administration reported the weighted average tariff
41
level was 9.2 percent in 1986, lower than 15.6 percent in
1985. However, tariffs for many industrial items of interest
to U.S. exporters are still high.
(2) Quantitative Restrictions
China has indicated that its import plan is intended to
balance trade bilaterally. It is certain that China will use
embargoes to restrict some consumer good imports that have
increased rapidly as living standards improved in recent
years. The United States estimates that the U.S. exports to
China lost about $10 million in 1986, because the United
States does not export a great deal of consumer goods to
China.
(3) China's Import Licensing
China's import licensing system is very complex. China's
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT)
issues two types of import licenses, "restricted" and
"unrestricted"
. Several other factors also determine whether
an import license is required. On June 1, 1987, the number
of imports requiring licenses was broadened to cover 45
categories of products and equipment. It was estimated that
China's import licensing system could reduce potential U.S.
exports up to $10 million in 1987.
(4) Standards, Testing, Labeling and Certification
China has issued regulations for pesticide registration
to protect the environment by requiring registration of any
new pesticide "put into commercial production." The United
42
states thought that China did not have similar requirements
for its domestic producers and this unequal enforcement of
the registrations reduced potential 1986 U.S. agricultural
chemical exports to $20 million.
(5) Lack of Intellectual Property Protection
China has not provided adequate and effective protection
in several areas. For example, China did not provide
protection for U.S. pharmaceutical and chemical companies,
also computer software copyrights. The U.S. estimated that
China's inadequate patent protection will cost $10 million to
$25 million in lost 1987 U.S. export to China.
(6) Service Barriers
Chinese restrictions on certain U.S. services including
shipping, insurance, banking, accounting and legal services
prevent U.S. firms from participating fully in China's service
sector. The economic impact of these barriers is difficult
to quantify.
(7) Investment Policy
Over the past several years, China has issued many new
regulations and taken steps to encourage foreign investment
during the past several years. The policies in the following
areas are considered the most critical: treatment of
investment; standards for expropriation; transfers of funds;
and access to international arbitration for settling disputes.
Total cumulative U.S. investment in China from 1979 to 1987
was estimated at more than $1.5 billion.
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(8) Other Barriers
a. Lack of Trading System Transparency
China's trading system suffers from a serious lack of
transparency. Both U.S. firms and Chinese officials lack a
complete understanding of how China's trading system
functions. Two factors further complicate this lack of
transparency. First, China's trade policy has frequently
fluctuated. Second, many U.S. firms believe that China
maintains a set of internal rules and regulations governing
foreign trade unavailable to foreigners. This forced
foreigners into disadvantageous positions when they competed
with China's domestic products, for example, organic
chemicals.
b. Foreign Exchange control
China uses administrative foreign exchange control to
restrict foreign products' entry into the domestic market.
Chinese companies cannot borrow foreign exchange on the
commercial market to purchase imports without Bank of China
approval. Foreign debt can be held only by bank of China-
accredited institutions (Office of the United States Trade
Representative, Department of Agriculture & Department of
Commerce)
.
From the Chinese side, trade barriers of the U.S. are as
following;
(1) U.S. import quantitative restrictions on some
"sensitive products" that are traditional Chinese exports,
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such as clothing and some other light industrial products.
The restrictions have limited Chinese exports, since the
United States is a major market for Chinese products. The
U.S. import protectionism may have twofold effects: the first
is to cut off China's exports substantially to the U.S.; the
second is to cause retaliation and the agreements between the
two countries could not be realized. For instance, in 1983,
China retaliated the U.S. unilateral freeze of Chinese textile
imports by reducing imports of the U.S. grains, cotton and
synthetic fibers.
(2) Restrictions of the U.S. on high-technology products.
Even though there has been large improvements in technological
product trade. China still desires to get more advanced
products from the United States.
It is difficult to predict the relationships between the
two countries in the future, because we do not know what kinds
of policies the two governments will follow. In recent
months, the relationship between the two countries has been
hurt significantly due to the massacre in Tiananmen Square on
June 3, 1989. The tragedy of the student democratic movement
being cracked down by the Chinese government with military
force has resulted in the Bush administration reconsidering
Sino-US relations. On the one hand. President Bush wants to
preserve Sino-U.S. relations, on the other hand, he must show
his support to the democratic movement. This is a very
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difficult decision. The Bush administration has already
imposed sanctions against China in support of the democratic
movement in China, including suspension of arm sells and the
postponement of new loans to China. Further policies might
be made. The U.S. businessmen are now extremely concerned
with the long-term economic environment of China.
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VI. CONCLUSION
During the past four decades, the Sino-U.S. relations
experienced dramatic changes: hostilities in 1950s, antagonism
of 1960s, recovery in 1970s, and further development in 1980s.
The desire for peace and both countries ' strategic concerns
made it possible for the two countries to come together. Both
political and diplomatic relationships have been significantly
improved, and economic relations have improved. Sino-U.S.
trade has increased rapidly since 1972. Currently, the U.S.
is an important trade partner for China. China also developed
its markets in the U.S.. While China is still not a major
trade partner of the U.S. in terms of total trade value and
market share, China is important to the U.S. in certain export
and import products.
Although the trade relationships have improved, there are
still problems which need to be solved, and trade barriers
need to be eliminated. Otherwise, trade will not capture all
of the economic gains which are available for both China and
the United States.
Future relationships between the two countries will depend
on the two governments' policies toward the other. Because
of the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989, the Sino-U.S.
relations have already been in a volatile situation. It is
difficult to predict how far the relations can go in the
future
.
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The rapid growth of the relationships between the United
States and the People's republic of China has drawn a lot of
attention since 1972. While political and diplomatic relations
have been improved, economic and trade relations have been
becoming more important. The purpose of this paper is to exam
the history of the Sino-U.S. trade relations and future
expectations. Focus is on those factors that had significant
impacts on trade. Three periods are employed to indicate the
development: (1) before 1972; (2) from 1972 to 1979; (3) since
1979.
The political relationships between the two countries
before 1972 can be summarized as "open hostilities of 1950s
and antagonism of 1960s", which made the trade relations
inhabited. During that period, the economic and trade
relationships between the two countries were almost
nonexistent.
The 1972 Shanghai Communique had historical impacts on
the relations between the two countries. From 1972 to 1979,
political relationships were improved significantly. The
common strategic concern over USSR of both countries remained
as a key element in the relations. The trade relations
improved quickly with constantly increasing U.S. import from
China and fluctuated U.S. export to China. Three reasons were
used to explain the U.S. export fluctuation: (1) the main U.S.
exports were agricultural products. China adjusted its
agricultural imports based on its own agricultural condition;
(2) since there was no diplomatic relations, China treated the
U.S. as a residual supplier; (3) , U.S. products were not
competitive in world markets in some years.
Since 1979 Normalization, the Sino-U.S. relationships
have become deeper, more durable and extensive. Economic and
trade relations were improved rapidly. There were many
agreements signed by the two governments. The U.S. has become
a very important trade partner of China.
There are some problems which need to be solved in the
future, for example, trade imbalance, trade barriers of both
countries.
The Tiananmen massacre of June 1989 made it difficult to
predict the future relations between the two countries, what
kind of policies these two governments would follow will have
great influence on the Sino-U.S. relationships.
